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Introduction
In recent years, the scientific, political and media interest in Muslims living in European countries has increased considerably. Events such as 9/11, the murder of Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh, the train bombs in London and Madrid and the reactions of the Muslim population to the Danish cartoon crisis popularized the notion that the Muslim second generation in Europe is not assimilating into the mainstream. Proponents of the claim that assimilation of Muslim immigrants in Europe has failed emphasize that the process is hampered by a strong attachment of migrants to Islam and their country of origin, symbolized by mosques arising in almost all larger cities as well as the numerous aerials in neighbourhoods with high proportions of migrants. In this article we seek to address how strongly the second generation is oriented towards their parents' birth country compared to the first generation, in terms of ethnic identification and ethno-cultural practices. We will do the same for religious identification and practices, for which differences between migrant generations have not yet been explored extensively (Dagevos and Gijsberts 2007; van Tubergen 2007 ; but see Phalet and ter Wal 2004) . Our interest is not only in studying the differences in level of ethnic and religious attachment, but also the relation between the two. Much research has been devoted to studying the relation between ethnic and national (or civic) identity (Liebkind 2001) , but other social identities, such as religious identity, have mostly been disregarded (Sheikh 2007) . It is still an open question to what extent migrants' religious and ethnic identities are interrelated (Deaux 2006; Sheikh 2007) , and how changes in one identity affect the other. Simply put: when individuals identify more with the country of destination, do they also become less religious?
Summarizing, we will investigate two issues: the levels of ethnic and religious attachment (identification and practice), and the interrelations between ethnic and religious identity. Our focus will be on differences between migration cohorts, net of compositional differences. We will investigate these issues on the basis of a dataset collected in 2004/5 including Turkish and Moroccan migrants of the first and second generation in the Netherlands (N01,861). Moroccans and Turks are the largest minority groups in the Netherlands and the vast majority (estimated as above 90 per cent) categorize themselves as Muslim.
Theory and hypotheses

Generational change in ethnic attachment
In countries of immigration, the way in which newcomers adapt to the host society has always been an important issue. One of the most widely used theories on migrant adaptation has been assimilation theory, which posits that migrants converge into the mainstream, leading to a 'decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it' (Alba and Nee 1997, p. 863) . Assimilation is thought to be a gradual, partly unconscious process, which is usually not completed within the life course (Gans 1973) . It has therefore mainly been studied 452 Mieke Maliepaard et al. through the process of generational change (Lieberson 1973; Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba 1999 Alba , 2005 . Empirical studies have provided evidence that the pace of assimilation depends on certain individual and contextual characteristics, although at the group level the expectation is that longer exposure to the host society results in increased adaptation. Assimilation may not always be beneficial to the migrant, since convergence with the mainstream may be downward as well as upward. This is reflected in Portes and Zhou's segmented assimilation framework, which shows that in the United States, children of immigrants do not necessarily follow a path of upward mobility and assimilation into the middle class, but may also assimilate into a 'rainbow underclass', mainly made up of African-Americans. Portes and Zhou (1993) assume that for higher human capital migrants, indicated for instance by higher levels of education, assimilation comes more easily, and will lead to structural integration tied to a loss of ethnic identity. Migrants with poor human capital, on the other hand, will not assimilate as easily into the mainstream. For this group they see two options: one is an attempt to assimilate, but failing to reach the mainstream and thus losing touch with their ethnic group and assimilating into adversarial subcultures. The second option is a strong maintenance of ethnic culture, which protects these inner-city youths from downward assimilation (Zhou 1997).
Other authors have questioned whether there are truly different pathways of inclusion, or whether assimilation merely occurs at a different pace (Alba and Nee 1997) . They find it especially questionable outside of the USA, where there is often no indigenous underclass that individuals can assimilate into (Silberman, Alba and Fournier 2007) . Proponents of this last point of view maintain that, sometimes slowly and often unintentionally, second and later generations gradually lose their distinctive ethnic culture, as a consequence of structural adaptation to the receiving nation (Gans 1994; Alba 1999; Esser 2004 ). We will study to what extent ethnic identification and religious identification change between generations and how education affects these processes of identification among the different generations.
Generational change in religious attachment
Studies of assimilation have largely focused on structural integration, and to a lesser extent on cultural integration. Common indicators of cultural integration are language and ethnic identification. Religion, often an important part of migrant life, has largely been neglected as a factor in the assimilation literature. International migration has been described as a theologizing experience, which affects migrants' religiosity positively (Smith 1978; Williams 1988) , but what are the effects in the long run? In the United States, sociologists expected Generational differences in ethnic and religious attachment 453 migrants and their offspring to retain their religion, which was thought to facilitate structural integration (Herberg 1955; Smith 1978) . This may have been applicable to the American context (Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000) , but probably less so to the Dutch Á and possibly even European Á context, which is very different in two respects. First, the religiousness of the majority population in the United States is relatively stable at a high level, whereas in the Netherlands it is one of the lowest in the world (Becker and De Hart 2006) . Previous studies have found that when moving to more secular surroundings, migrants tend to become more secular (Stump 1984; Smith, Sikkink and Baily 1998; Inglehart and Norris 2009) . Second, the majority of the migrants in the US come from a Christian background, like the majority population (Firebaugh and Harley 1991) , whereas in the Netherlands this is not the case, since many migrants are Muslim. Islam is to a large extent an ethnic religion which is tied to the home country (Kemper 1996 ; Arends-Tó th and van de Vijver 2004). As a consequence, religion is likely to have a bridging function in the United States, aiding structural and social integration. One is not expected to lose one's religion in order to become a 'real American'. In the Dutch public discourse, on the other hand, Islam is portrayed as a religion restricting structural integration, and as hampering social integration due to large cultural differences. Being Muslim can therefore be seen as more of a boundary than a bridge (Alba 2005) . Thus, with increasing adaptation to the host country, one would expect decreasing religiosity among migrants in the Netherlands. There have been some studies on this in the European context, but they do not yield a clear picture. On the one hand, there are studies which indicate that among the second generation, Islam is an important part of life (Saeed, Blain and Forbes 1999; Raj 2000; De Koning 2008; Ketner 2008) . On the other hand, studies that compare the first and second generation (which are relatively rare) give an indication that in the Netherlands, the average religiosity among the second generation is less strong than among the first (Phalet and ter Wal 2004) .
Expectations on generational change
The main reason for expecting increased adaptation to the host country by the second generation is exposure to the country and way of life. There are a number of ways in which this process can be accelerated, such as through education or participation in the labour market. In these ways individuals are more exposed to society and more likely to assimilate (Van Tubergen 2006 . There are other structural factors which are likely to hamper assimilation, such as getting married to a spouse with the same ethnic background (Kalmijn 1998) . We expect that the second generation will be less attached to the 454 Mieke Maliepaard et al. ethnic and religious group than the first because of structural differences, but we also anticipate that there will be an additional generation effect since the second generation is socialized from a young age in the Netherlands. Therefore we expect that the second generation will identify less strongly with their ethnic group than the first (H1) and that the second generation will identify less strongly as Muslim than the first (H2). We expect a positive relation between identification and congruent behaviour. Behaviour can be an expression of one's identity which indicates group membership (Ashmore, Deaux and McLoughlin-Volpe 2004) . In addition, and especially in the case of religion, practice follows normatively from membership: it is expected of Muslims that they adhere to certain religious rules, and therefore it is quite probable that the more strongly one identifies as Muslim the more likely it is that this identity will be translated into certain practices. Due to the supposed relation between identity and practice, we formulate the hypotheses that the second generation will engage less in ethno-cultural practice than the first (H3) and that the second generation will engage less in religious practice than the first (H4). Previous research (Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 1997) has shown that education in particular is a catalyst of assimilation in other life domains: the higher the education, the more rapidly processes of assimilation take place. This would especially apply to the first generation: higher educated migrants can use their resources to increase language proficiency and to work in an environment with relatively more natives. Lower educated migrants on the other hand are often confined to manual labour, and contacts within ethnic groups, hampering assimilation. For the second generation, we expect the effects of education to be less of a catalyst for assimilation in other domains: the entire second generation attains their education in the host society. In both the lower and higher educational tracks, the second generation is socialized with the values, norms and language of the new country. We therefore expect that the effect of education on ethnic and religious attachment will be smaller for the second generation than for the first generation migrants (H5).
Relation between ethnic and religious identity
In our first hypotheses we argued that second generation migrants on average will identify less strongly with their ethnic and religious group than the first generation. However, we not only examine levels of religious or ethnic attachment, but also the extent to which they are related. An average decline in ethnic and religious attachment among the second generation does not necessarily mean that the two are related at the individual level. Past research has shown that among migrant groups religion is interconnected strongly with ethnic culture Generational differences in ethnic and religious attachment 455 (Hammond 1988; Gans 1994) . However, most studies have focused on first generation migrants, and there are few that explicitly look at the role religion plays in assimilation (Deaux 2006; Sheikh 2007) . Herbert Gans (1994) proposed that over generations, as ethnic and religious identities decline, the two remain intertwined within individuals. Thus, individuals who identify less with their ethnic group should also be less religious. Although there have been some empirical studies on this topic among the second generation in Europe, the evidence has been mixed. On the one hand, various qualitative studies indicate that, among the second generation, strong religious identities can be associated with host country identification, and are not necessarily strongly related to ethnic identification (Knott and Khokher 1993; Saeed, Blain and Forbes 1999; Raj 2000; De Koning and Bartels 2005) . This implies that there should be hardly any correlation between ethnic and religious identity. However, these findings result from relatively small-scale studies often based on practising Muslims only. On the other hand, various quantitative studies in the Netherlands have shown that Turkish and Moroccan minorities who identify strongly with their religious group also identify more strongly with their ethnic group (Phalet and Gü ngö r 2004) and less strongly with the Dutch (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007) . However, these studies do not look at differences between generations in the relation between ethnic and religious identity. We expect that there is a positive relation between ethnic and religious identity among both the first and second generation (H6a). Following Gans (1994) , we expect that the interrelation between ethnic and religious identity is as strong for the second generation as for the first generation (H6b).
Methods
Data
We will use the LAS survey on the living situation of ethnic minorities in cities. These data were gathered among minorities by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research/SCP between November 2004 and May 2005. The sample was drawn from the population registers in the fifty largest cities in the Netherlands (for more information, see Dagevos and Gijsberts 2005) . Since minority groups are overrepresented in the larger cities in the Netherlands, a reasonable coverage across the Netherlands is reached: 75 to 80 per cent of these ethnic groups are living in these fifty cities. We use only the data from the Turkish and Moroccan respondents. In the Dutch statistics one is Turkish or Moroccan either when one is born in Turkey/Morocco, or when one is born in the Netherlands, and has one or two parents from Turkey/Morocco. In our sample 99 per cent of this cohort have parents 456 Mieke Maliepaard et al. who are both from Turkey or Morocco. Participants were interviewed face-to-face (computer-assisted personal interviewing). Only those participants who were foreign-born and not fluent in Dutch were interviewed in their native languages by bilingual interviewers. The response rate was 45 per cent for the Turkish-and Moroccan-Dutch group. This is higher than in other comparable research among ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands.
To correct for possible selectivity in the response rates, the data were weighted using a number of demographic characteristics, i.e. age, sex, marital status, presence of children and migration generation. Weights are generally low, implying that respondents hardly differ from the population on these characteristics.
Measures
We compare different migrant cohorts of the first and second generation to assess differences, a common alternative to measuring assimilation or acculturation over time (Liebkind 2001) . We distinguish five migrant cohorts. The first cohort (n 0451) consists of children of at least one Turkish or Moroccan parent who were born in the Netherlands, usually referred to as the second generation. The second migrant cohort (n 0274) is made up of migrants who came to the Netherlands between 1994 and 2004; the third cohort came between 1984 and 1993 (n 0459); the fourth between 1974 and 1983 (n 0471); and the fifth migrant cohort moved to the Netherlands before 1974 (n0174). The cohorts differ strongly in their age distribution. Obviously, the second generation (i.e. the first cohort) is the youngest, with a mean age of 22 (sd 5.3). After that, the mean age progressively rises. Following previous research that analyses first and second generation migrants simultaneously, the migration cohorts are used as a proxy for length of stay effects in the model (Dagevos and Schellingerhout 2003) . Because cohorts are highly correlated with age (r 0.73), we are unable to include both in the model. We therefore decided instead to control for life cycle variables such as getting married and having children, which are theoretically expected to be related to our outcome variables.
Ethnic (and national) identity was measured by the sole item available on this topic, the question 'Do you feel more Dutch or more Moroccan (Turkish)?' Answers were given on a five-point scale, with a range from completely Moroccan (Turkish), more Moroccan (Turkish) than Dutch, as much Dutch as Moroccan (Turkish), more Dutch than Moroccan (Turkish), to completely Dutch. In order to assess the degree of ethno-cultural practice 2 in which individuals engage, six items regarding popular culture and media-use were combined. Respondents were asked whether the last party and Generational differences in ethnic and religious attachment 457 the last movie they went to was predominantly attended by co-ethnics or by native Dutch. In addition, they were asked how often they read newspapers from their country of origin, listen to music, watch television and read magazines from their country origin, on a scale from 1 (never) to 6 (every day). These two facets of ethno-cultural practice are highly correlated. Due to a very skewed distribution (a high percentage never engage in these activities) all items were dichotomized (respondent engages in ethno-cultural activities or does not) and added up, forming an ethno-cultural practice measure ranging from 0 (does not engage in any of these activities) to 6 (engages in all these activities). In the analyses of ethno-cultural practice, we also take into account Dutch language ability and the general level of participation. A participation variable was constructed on the basis of the same six items, this time including ethno-cultural as well as practices outside the realm of the ethnic group (e.g. 'do you watch TV' or 'do you read a newspaper'). The correlation between the participation and ethno-cultural practice measures is .264.
We use two measures to indicate religious identity. The first is the nominal self-identification of being Muslim. All respondents are asked whether they belong to a religious group. Eight per cent do not belong to a religious group (n 0151), and the other 92 per cent are Muslim (n 01,710). Only the religious individuals answered the questions on religious identity and practice mentioned below.
The second measurement of religious identity indicates the strength of identification (Ashmore, Deaux and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004) . This is measured by two items on religious attachment: 'when someone says something negative about my religion I feel personally hurt', and 'no one should question my religion'. The items were answered on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from completely agree to completely disagree. The two items are positively correlated r(1659)0.53, p B.001, and their standardized mean score was used to indicate religious identity. In previous research among Muslims, religious identity was measured with measures of importance of religion to the self (Phalet and Gü ngö r 2004; Verkuyten 2007 ) but this seemed to be a nominal rather than a continuous variable: all Muslim respondents attach (great) importance to their religion. In our data, comparable results were attained: 92 per cent of all Muslim respondents feel that their religion is (very) important to them. To measure the strength of religious identity, we therefore use the more demanding attachment to identity (Ashmore, Deaux and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004) .
Religious practice was measured by two items, participating in Ramadan (scale 1Á4, ranging from did not participate to participated fully) and frequency of prayer (scale 1Á8, ranging from never to five times a day). The two items are positively correlated r(1710)0.39, pB.001. They were recoded into the same scale, and their mean score was used to indicate religious practice. Because we expect that the cohort differences may partly be explained by structural differences, we include measures of education, language proficiency, participation in the labour market and life stages. For education, the highest level of completed education (either in the Netherlands or abroad) was indicated on a seven-point scale, ranging from no education to tertiary education. Participants (n 0240) still enrolled in schools were given the score of the education level they were currently enrolled in. Language proficiency was measured by taking the added score on two items, correlated positively with r(1710)0.71, pB.001, which indicated whether the respondent had trouble reading and speaking Dutch (never, sometimes, often). Dutch language proficiency will be taken into account only in explaining ethno-cultural practice. Language proficiency affects the degree to which participation in society is possible and lack of Dutch language proficiency may force migrants to engage in activities with co-ethnics only.
In addition, two dummies were included for participation in the labour market: being employed (working more than twelve hours a week) and being unemployed. Being economically inactive was used as the reference category. In order to take life stages into account, a marriage dummy was included (has never been married vs. is married, divorced or widowed), and a dummy for having children (yes/no). The vast majority (85 per cent) of married respondents are married to a co-ethnic. A little over 13 per cent are married to someone born in the Netherlands, mostly a co-ethnic of the second generation. Finally gender and ethnicity were also included. We do not take into account different Islamic denominations, because 60 per cent of the Muslim respondents did not specify what denomination they belonged to. In the Muslim population of the Netherlands, a vast majority are estimated to be Sunni (Buijs and Rath 2002) . A summary of the descriptive statistics can be found in the Appendix.
Results
We start our analyses by assessing the differences in levels of religious and ethnic identity and practice. First we assess what percentage of the cohorts think of themselves as Muslim. We find a growing percentage of individuals who do not call themselves Muslim, ranging from 5.3 per cent among the earliest migration cohort (migrated before 1974) to 12 per cent among the second generation. Although this is still a very small segment of the total population, there is clearly a decrease in religious affiliation over the cohorts. We performed a logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of identifying oneself as Muslim (results not shown). The results indicate that the differences between cohorts can be explained by educational differences between the cohorts.
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Higher educated individuals are less likely to be religious. We also find a strong effect of ethnic identification on nominal Muslim self-identification. This latter finding implies that the more Dutch (and the less Turkish/Moroccan) you feel, the less likely you are to consider yourself a Muslim. Due to the fact that the questions about religion were only asked to those respondents who define themselves as Muslim, the proceeding analyses will only take into account Muslim respondents (n01,710). We are now looking at the degree of identification and the frequency of practice among self-proclaimed Muslims.
Gross differences in the degree of identification and practice between cohorts are estimated in models a (Tables 1 and 2 ). Here we can clearly see that the second generation scores significantly lower than almost all cohorts of the first generation on all four dependent variables. Some of the differences in ethnic identity among the first generation cohorts are significant (the most recent migrants have a stronger ethnic identity than the earlier migrants), but this is not the case for religious identity nor for ethnic and religious practice. As was expected, the second generation Muslims identify less strongly with their ethnic group and with their religious group than the first generation does, and also engage less frequently in religious and ethno-cultural practice.
In a second step, we investigate to what extent the cohort differences are due to compositional differences between the groups. Therefore we add a number of explanatory variables (models b). For ethnic identity (model 1b), adding these variables changes the picture somewhat: differences in ethnic identity remain between the late first and second generation, but the earliest first generation cohorts (pre-1974 and 1974Á83) do not differ from the second generation. The decrease in difference between the cohorts is mostly due to education, which has a negative effect on ethnic identity. We do not find any life cycle effects (of marriage or having children). The persistence of cohort effects confirms that assimilation is only partly induced by education and other structural differences, but that being born in the Netherlands has assimilative effects as well. Education positively affects assimilation, but the second generation is not more assimilated because it is more educated. This confirms our first hypothesis.
For religious identity the same procedure was followed (model 2b). As in the model predicting ethnic identity, the difference between the early migrant cohorts and the second generation disappears. The difference originally found between the groups can be attributed to the fact that the earliest migrants had very limited education, contrary to the second generation. The difference between the late first generation cohorts and the second generation remains, supporting our second hypothesis. As was expected, higher education and being employed, as well as being unemployed (compared to being economically inactive), are associated with a weaker religious identity. Again no life cycle effects were found. The models including the structural variables are better at predicting ethnic and religious practice than at predicting identity. The cohort effects on ethno-cultural practice (model 3b) become a little weaker after taking into account structural differences, but still the second generation stands out as being engaged least in ethnocultural practice Á even when controlled for education, language proficiency and general levels of participation. Compositional differences thus do not explain the cohort differences. This confirms our third hypothesis. We find that Turks engage in ethno-cultural practice more often than Moroccans do, higher educated and working people engage less than lower educated and economically inactive people, and people who speak Dutch better engage less than those who have lower language proficiency. Life cycle effects do affect the degree of ethno-cultural practice. Married people with children engage more in ethno-cultural practice than unmarried people and people without children.
In the model predicting religious practice (model 4b), we again find that the differences between cohorts diminish after including structural variables, but significant differences remain, confirming our fourth hypothesis. Structural factors do not affect religious and ethno-cultural practice in the same way. For instance, we find that Moroccans engage more in religious practice than Turks do (whereas for ethno-cultural practice it was the other way around). Women tend to engage in religious practice more often than men, whereas this is not the case for ethno-cultural practice. Being married does not seem to affect religious practice, but individuals with children engage in more religious practice than those without. Apparently the life cycle does not affect to what extent individuals identify with a certain group, but it does affect the degree to which they practise. Surprisingly, education has no effect on religious practice. Since the European literature often finds education to be associated with lower religious participation, we took a closer look at this relation. In hypothesis 5, we formulated the expectation that effects of education would be smaller among the second generation. It turns out that education does affect religious practice differently among the different cohorts (results not shown). For the earliest cohorts the effect is in accordance with previous research: higher education is associated with less religious practice. For the most recent migration cohorts, education has a very small effect on religious practice, and its effect is reversed: higher education is associated with more religious practice. Remarkably, this positive effect of education is also found among the second generation, and is even stronger. For the second generation, a higher education is associated with more religious practice, which contrasts with our expectations as formulated in the fifth hypothesis. Moreover, we found no significant interaction effect between education and cohort explaining ethnic and religious identity or explaining ethno-cultural practice, refuting the fifth hypothesis.
In a final step, we investigated to what extent the differences in ethnic identity are related to religious differences, and vice versa (model 1c/2c). People who identify strongly with their religion also identify more strongly with their ethnic group (model 1c). This also works the other way around. People who feel more Turkish/Moroccan tend to identify more strongly with their religion (model 2c). Thus, as expected, we find a positive relation between ethnic and religious identity. For religious identity, ethnic identity explains the remaining cohort effects, implying that the differences in religious identity between the recent migrants and the second generation are due to the fact that the former are more attached to their ethnic group. Religious identity on the other hand does not explain much of the cohort differences in ethnic identity. We also tested to what extent practice is predicated upon identity (model 3c/4c). Ethnic identity has a positive effect on ethno-cultural practice, but also religious identity is a good predictor of ethno-cultural practice. However, although their size diminishes, the differences between the cohorts of the first and second generation almost all remain significant (model 3c). This indicates that cohort differences on ethno-cultural practice are not due to stronger ethnic or religious identity of the first generation. For religious practice, we find the same: identity plays a role, but does not explain the cohort differences (model 4c). The fact that ethnic and religious identity both affect religious and ethno-cultural practices points once again to the interrelatedness of the two.
Our sixth hypothesis predicted a positive relation between ethnic and religious identity for both first generation and second generation cohorts. Table 3 presents the correlations between the two for all cohorts. Interestingly, we find that the relation between religious and ethnic identity in our overall sample is not very strong, and that it is by far strongest for the second generation. This is not due to a lack of variance among the first generation; variances turn out to be similar among the first and second generation. To assess whether the stronger relation between ethnic and religious identity for the second generation is maintained after controlling for other factors, we added an interaction term to models 1c and 2c (see Table 4 ). Model 2d shows that there is a smaller effect of ethnic identity on religious identity for almost all first generation cohorts compared to the second generation. This indicates that for the second generation, feeling Moroccan or Turkish plays a stronger role in maintaining a religious identity than it does for the first. Model 1d shows that the effect of religious identity on ethnic identity is also smaller among the first generation cohorts, although the parameters do not reach significance. These findings confirm our sixth hypothesis: there is a positive relation between ethnic and religious identity for both the first and second generation. In addition, we answered an until now unaddressed question: for the second generation, feeling Moroccan or Turkish is more strongly associated with being Muslim than it is for the first generation, refuting hypothesis 6b, where we predicted that the effects would be similar among the generational cohorts.
Discussion
In this paper we addressed generational differences in the levels of ethnic and religious identity and practice. Our findings indicate that although the vast majority of second generation Turks and Moroccans living in the Netherlands still refer to themselves as Muslim, they identify less strongly with their ethnic and religious group and engage less in ethno-cultural and religious practices. The generational differences are not solely due to compositional effects. Although the second generation is higher educated, more often without children and employed and (still) without children, this only accounts for part of the differences between the generations. Our findings support our expectations regarding socio-cultural assimilation of migrants and their offspring. Growing up in a secular receiving context affects both ethnic and religious attachment negatively. The decline of religious and ethnic identity is found to be a coupled decline. For those individuals who feel more Dutch, religion is less important than for those who feel more strongly Turkish or Moroccan. This coupled decline, which is in line with expectations from Gans (1994) and Hammond (1988) , supports the notion that in a secular receiving context socio-cultural integration is related to religious decline. Surprisingly, religious and ethnic identity are more strongly intertwined for the second generation than for the first, meaning that being Muslim is more strongly related to feeling Turkish or Moroccan for this group. The majority of Muslims in the Netherlands have relatively low socio-economic status. Being Muslim is therefore associated with other (negative) characteristics, and seen as a barrier to integration (Foner and Alba 2008) . Muslims represent the typical outsider, and the boundaries between the majority and the Muslim minority are very strong or 'bright' (Alba 2005) . Becoming Dutch therefore entails a loss of strong religious identity, more so than it would in other receiving contexts.
The fact that the decline is coupled has a number of implications. First, the coupled decline indicates that the development of a 'Dutch Islam', in which Islam is separated from the original migrant or ethnic connotation, is at present unlikely. Those individuals from the second generation who are strongly religious are more likely to associate strongly with their own ethnic group, not only in terms of identification, but also in terms of social activities and use of media. This ties in with the fear of the majority population that strongly religious Muslims do not want to take part in Dutch society, and that they will continue to form a separate group in society, despite their longterm presence. Secondly, the coupled decline indicates that individuals who resist assimilation find a positive identity in their ethnic group. This identity is not just symbolic, but expressed in ethno-cultural practices, religious identification and religious practices. Individuals on the other hand who do assimilate seem to lose these ties to the ethnic group, which also affects their religious attachment. Future longitudinal studies can shed more light on these processes.
The finding of a coupled decline, even stronger for the second generation than for the first, is not in line with a number of qualitative studies that were conducted in Europe in previous years (e.g. Knott and Khokher 1993; Sunier 1996; Schmidt 2002; De Koning and Bartels 2005; Buijs, Demant and Hamdy 2006) . However, the small scale of these studies makes them vulnerable to stronger selection effects. They usually focus on religiously active youth, and it may be the case that these are the ones no longer attached to their parents' birth country but more focused on the Umma (the worldwide Islamic Generational differences in ethnic and religious attachment 467 community). In our data, on the other hand, individuals with more radical ideas are possibly underrepresented. Despite these issues, we find strong evidence that, overall, the second generation attaches less importance to both their religion and ethnic origins than their parents' generation does. This is in line with general ideas and findings that assimilation progresses among generations (Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 1997; Alba 2005) .
One striking difference between the generations is that among the second generation, higher educated individuals engage in more religious practice than lower educated individuals do, whereas the reverse relation was found for the early first generation migrants. The finding is remarkable in the sense that education has often been regarded as one of the main catalysts of assimilation and secularization (Need and De Graaf 1996) ; Hagendoorn, Veenman and Vollebergh 2003; Phalet and ter Wal 2004) . We now see that this is too simple. Our analyses show that both among the first generation and the second generation, the higher educated are more often nonreligious than the lower educated. Also, the higher educated identify less strongly with their religious and ethnic group. However, the higher educated among the second generation who are religious practise more than the lower educated. We should keep in mind though that on average the second generation does score lower on all measures of ethnic and religious identity and practice than the first generation. There is thus no evidence for ethno-religious revival.
With this study we add to the debate currently going on in academia, the media and politics regarding the affiliation and integration of second generation (Muslim) migrants. The often perceived increase in religiousness among young Muslims is not reflected in our results. Notes 1. Although this is a measure often used in social psychology (Liebkind 2001) , we cannot know whether those individuals who chose the middle category ('as much Dutch as Moroccan/Turkish') identify strongly with both categories or very little with either category. Because low identification with both categories may affect the models, we performed some additional analyses. The respondents in the middle category were asked how they would rate different groups (such as the ethnic Dutch, Moroccans, Turks, etc.) on a scale from 0 (low) to 100 (high), where 50 was neutral. Of this group only 4 per cent gave a score of under 50 per cent to both their ethnic and the national group on this item, which seems to indicate that marginalization (not identifying with either group) is rare. Since 89 per cent regard both groups neutrally or positively, we assume that this will not pose problems for our analyses, and we continue using the single indicator of identity mentioned above. 2. In this contribution we refer to cultural practices of Turkish-and Moroccan-Dutch as 'ethno-cultural practices' although we are aware that Dutch cultural practices are also ethnic in nature. 
